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Notes of Cases 817
within any of the classes of subjects enumarated in section 91 shall be
deemed not to come within section 92 .
In the result, Dickson C.J.C . upheld section 31 .1 on the basis that
it was sufficiently integrated into the valid Combines Investigation Act
scheme and did not overly intrude into provincial spheres . He held that
(1) remedial provisions like section 31.1 are typically less intrusive in
relation to provincial powers, (2) the section 31 .1 action has a limited
scope, being confined to the four corners of the Act, and (3) Parliament
is not precluded from creating civil causes of action in any event.
Conclusion
City National Leasing is a foundation case in Canadian constitu-
tional law. It reinvigorates a central federal power and implicitly over-
rules a major relic from Privy Council days .
My major criticism is that Dickson C.J .C .'s "provincial encroach-
ment" test as a criterion of validity of federal legislation should be
reconsidered . At best, it simply adds a new verbal test to the myriad of
old ones . At worst, it reflects an attitude that federal power exists in
some cases only where it is unobtrusive. That is not true to the scheme
of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1 867 or even to the
central thrust of City National Leasing itself.
Introduction
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-PENDENT PARTIES-
ABORIGINAL TITLE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAw-
CHARTER CHALLENGES-REFORM PROPOSALS :
Roberts v. Canada .
J.M. Evans and Brian Slattery*
Nearly twenty years after its foundation, the Federal Court of
Canada is still struggling for acceptance by the legal profession . Some
critics attribute this to the disappointing quality of the court's jurispru
dence and the dubious nature of certain appointments to its bench. What-
ever merits these criticisms may have-and they can be overstated-they
do not go to the heart of the problem. The fundamental reason for the
court's difficulties is that its existence challenges the pre-eminent posi-
tion long enjoyed by superior courts in the essentially unitary judicial
*J .M . Evans and Brian Slattery, both of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
North York, Ontario.
The authors would like to thank Professor Kent McNeil for his helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
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system established by the Constitution Act, 1867.' As La Forest J. has
recently noted in a different context: "They may not, in strictness, be
national courts, but they are the ordinary courts of the land to which the
citizen customarily turns when he has need to resort to the administra-
tion of justice. -2
The Federal Court's apparently endless jurisdictional difficulties are
both a symptom and a cause of the problem. The most important diffi-
culties stem from the widely held judicial view that the constitutional
status of superior courts should be protected, and that Parliament's power
to create courts of federal jurisdiction under section 101 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 accordingly ought to be narrowly construed . This approach
is equally evident in the strict interpretation placed by the courts on
various provisions of the Federal Court Act3 itself.
1 Ss . 96-100 .
Z Ontario (A.G .) v. Pembina Exploration Can . Ltd., 11989] 1 S .C.R . 206, at p. 225.
3 R.S.C . 1985, c. F-7. See, for example, Northern Pipeline Agency v. Perehinec,
198312 S .C.R . 513, where the issue was whether the Federal Court's exclusive juris-
diction in s. 17(2)(b) over cases in which "the claim arises out of a contract entered into
by or on behalf of the Crown" applied to proceedings for breach of contract instituted
against a Crown corporation, an agency of the Crown. The court held that it did not.
The approach to the interpretation of the Act was formulated by Estey J. as follows (at
pp . 521-522):
The transfer of jurisdiction to the Federal Court of Canada, inter alia, in all cases
where relief is claimed against the Crown, signifies an exception to the general rule
[that the superior courts of the provinces have general jurisdiction over federal and
provincial matters] . There remains, however, as a fundamental principle of the
court system as structured by the Constitution Act, 1567, a presumption ofjurisdic-
tion in the provincial courts . (Emphasis added) .
See also, Law Society of B .C . v. A.-G. Can. (1980), 108 D.L.R . (3d) 753 (B .C.C.A .)
(Federal Court's power to grant a declaration as "relief" against the Crown and the
Attorney-General pursuant to ss . 17(1), 18(b)) does not include a declaration of invalid-
ity : this point of statutory interpretation was left open in the Supreme Court of Canada,
[1982] 2 S .C.R . 307, at p. 326) ; Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
v. Ranville, [1982] 2 S .C.R . 518 (s . 96 judges always act as such for the purpose of
s. 2(g) of the Federal Court Act, and are therefore unreviewable by the Federal Court) ;
R. v. Miller, [198512 S.C.R . 613 (Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction under s . 18(a)
to issue certiorari against "a federal board, commission or other tribunal" does not
include certiorari when used in aid of habeas corpus); see, infra, footnote 95 .
The courts' generous approach to the constitutional and statutory scope of the Fed-
eral Court's jurisdiction in respect of Canadian maritime law provides a sharp contrast:
see, for example, ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc.,
[19861 1 S.C.R . 752; for a comment on this decision, see H.P. Glenn (1987), 66 Can.
Bar Rev. 360; earlier cases are reviewed by J.M . Evans (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 124,
esp. at pp . 148-150. See also infra, footnotes 9 and 16 .
For an excellent overview of the Federal Court's jurisdiction, see D. Sgayias et al .,
Federal Court Practice 1988 (1987), Part 1. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
the importance of the essentially unitary court system in Canada's constitutional struc-




The jurisdictional problems afflicting the Federal Court became appar-
ent in three decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the late 1970s: Quebec North Shore, 4 McNamara Construction,5 and
Thomas Fuller Construction . 6 These decisions held that two require-
ments must be met before the Federal Court may assume jurisdiction in
a case . The first stems from the fact that, unlike the superior courts, the
Federal Court is a statutory court and has no inherent jurisdiction . So,
the court may only entertain a matter if the Federal Court Act or some
other federal statute gives it jurisdiction . We may call this the statutory
requirement . However, Parliament does not have an unlimited power to
confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court. Its power is strictly confined by
the wording of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which autho-
rizes Parliament to create "additional Courts for the better Administra-
tion of the Laws of Canada" . The Supreme Court focused on the phrase,
"Laws of Canada", and held that it referred only tofederal laws, to the
exclusion, in particular, of provincial laws . Thus, even where the statu-
tory requirement is satisfied, it must further be shown that a proceeding
is squarely grounded on "applicable and existing federal law" 8 before
the Federal Court can entertain it . We may call this second hurdle the
constitutional requirement .
The next question is what sort of law can be said to constitute
"federal law" . Acts of Parliament and federal subordinate legislation
obviously qualify. The court also held that the common law relating to
matters within federal jurisdiction may in some cases constitute federal
law, and it cited as an example the common law rules governing the
liability of the federal Crown . However, the court rejected the broader
proposition that a law was federal merely because Parliament had the
constitutional power to amend or replace it . In other words, the constitu-
tional reach of federal judicial power was not coterminous with federal
legislative competence.9 Thus, a party suing the federal Crown could be
required by statute to resort to the Federal Court, because the common
4 Quebec North Shore Paper Co . v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., {1977] 2 S .C.R . 1054 .
5 McNamara Const . (Western) Ltd . v. The Queen, (1977] 2 S .C.R . 654 .
6 The Queen v . Thomas Fuller Const . Co . (1958) Ltd ., [1980] 1 S.C.R . 695 .
7 In contrast, provincial legislatures are empowered by section 92(14) of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867 to confer jurisdiction upon inferior provincial courts over matters
falling within federal legislative competence : Pembina Exploration Can . Ltd., supra,
footnote 2 .
8 Quebec North Shore Paper Co., supra, footnote 4, at pp . 1065-1066 (per Laskin
C .J.C .) .
9 Maritime law is something of an exception : see footnotes 3 and 16 . The court has
interpreted both the statutory grant of jurisdiction and the federal nature of the law that
nourishes it as co-extensive with Parliament's power to legislate in matters of navigation
and shipping, conferred by s . 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867 .
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law respecting Crown liability qualified as federal law. However, the
Federal Court would not generally have jurisdiction over a suit by the
federal Crown against another party, as for breach of contract or in tort,
because its rights would not normally depend upon a law of Canada, but
upon provincial law. I°
The Supreme Court further ruled that these strict constitutional lim-
itations would not be relaxed to enable the Federal Court to decide the
legal rights and duties of a third party or a co-defendant in a proceeding
otherwise governed by federal law and within the court's jurisdiction, I I
If the legal rights and duties of the added party are not "based" on
federal law, but are only "affected" by it, then a separate proceeding
must be instituted in a provincial court, even though the claim against
the party defendant or third party arises from essentially the same facts
as the main action .
These constitutional restrictions on federal jurisdiction have caused
litigants serious inconvenience, expense and delay. The most egregious
problems have arisen in multi-party litigation involving the federal Crown,
due largely to section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act, which gives the
court exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where relief is claimed against
the federal Crown. 12 A plaintiff who is suing the federal Crown in the
Federal Court, as section 17(1) requires, will normally be unable to join
another party, such as a Crown servant, as a co-defendant unless the
co-defendant's liability also depends on federal law. For the same rea-
son, the Crown as defendant cannot serve a third party notice because
claims to contribution or indemnity do not rest on federal law. Separate
proceedings must be instituted for this purpose in provincial courts, which,
of course, will not be bound by the findings or result of the main action .
Moreover, the federal Crown cannot be made a party defendant, served
with a third party notice, or subjected to a counterclaim in proceedings
for relief instituted by a private litigant in a provincial court. This is
because claims against the Crown must be brought in the Federal Court
under section 17(1) .
Two Supreme Court decisions released in 1980 suggested that some
relief from this jurisdictional nightmare might be on its way. In Rhine 13
" If the Crown's claim is so closely regulated and defined by a federal statute that
its rights can be said to be "based" on federal law, the action will be within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Court: see the contract cases of Rhine and Atwcda, infra, footnotes
13 and 14, and the tort cases cited infra, footnote 53 .
Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6.
1= The court is also given concurrent jurisdiction in civil proceedings in which
either the Crown or the Attorney General of Canada claims relief (section 17(5)(a)), or
relief is sought against Crown officers or servants for anything done or omitted in the
performance of their duties (section 17(5)(b)) .
13 Rhine v. The Queen, 1198012 S .C.R . 442 (Can .) .
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and Frytula14 the court upheld federal jurisdiction over cases where the
Crown was claiming as the guarantor of contractual debts incurred pur-
suant to federal statutory schemes providing financial assistance to wheat
farmers and students respectively. The court stated that, even though the
Crown's claim was contractual in nature, the transaction from which it
arose was so extensively regulated by federal legislation that the legal
rights and liabilities in question could be said to be based on applicable
and existing federal law.
Additional evidence that the court might be relaxing its rigid stance
was provided in 1986 by the judgment in ITO-International Terminal
Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. 15 In this case the Supreme Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain an action for
damages brought by the owner of goods against terminal operators in
Montreal for loss of its goods, which were stored with the defendants
after being unloaded from the carrying vessel . This was not the first
case in which the court had taken a generous view of the Federal Court's
statutory jurisdiction in matters of Canadian maritime law, and of the
federal character of that law. 16 However, two points made by McIntyre
J. seemed potentially relevant to other aspects of federal jurisdiction on
which the court previously had been distinctly parsimonious .
First, he stated that, while maritime law might not historically have
included an action in tort for the loss of goods on land, tI
. . . cargo handling and incidental storage before delivery and before the goods
pass from the custody of a terminal operator within the port is sufficiently linked to
the contract of carriage by sea to constitute a maritime matter within the ambit of
Canadian maritime law as defined by section 2 of the Federal Court Act.
The idea that a statutory grant of jurisdiction could be interpreted to
include matters "integrally connected" 18 might well be extended to other
provisions of the Federal Court Act.
Second, McIntyre J. stated that, if a case is in "pith and sub-
stance" within the Federal Court's statutory jurisdiction, the court may
determine a question of provincial law arising incidentally in a dispute
otherwise governed by federal law. 19 Taken together with Rhine and l'rytula,
this holding suggested that the Federal Court could constitutionally enter-
tain cases where the rights of the parties were neither so exclusively, nor
14 Prytula v. The Queen, ibid .
15 Supra, footnote 3.
16 See, for example, Sivaco Wire & Nail Co . v. Tropwood A.G., [1979] 2 S.C.R .
157 ; Antares Shipping Corp . v. The Ship "Capricorn", [1980] 1 S.C.R . 553 . And see
supra, footnote 3 .
17 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 775. (Emphasis added) .
18 Ibid., at p. 774.
19 Ibid ., at p. 781 .
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so closely regulated by a law of Canada as earlier jurisprudence seemed
to require.'°
Despite these decisions, the law of federal jurisdiction has remained
basically a shambles. For instance, a municipality seeking to recover
monies paid to Ontario under an unconstitutional provision of a federal
statute 21 was recently obliged to institute two separate sets of proceed-
ings, one against the federal Crown in the Federal Court-2 and the other
against Ontario in the provincial courts . 23 Not surprisingly, the conse-
quent waste of resources attracted judicial criticism . 24
Several current developments, however, offer some small hope of
respite. We begin with an analysis of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Roberts v. Canada,-s which continues the trend toward
greater flexibility in applying the jurisdictional requirements . We then
examine the new phenomenon of Charter challenges to the exclusive
character of the Federal Court's jurisdiction in certain areas, which, as
we have seen, is at the root of many difficulties . Finally, we offer some
brief comments on reforms to the Federal Court Act contained in the
recently introduced Bill C-38 .
Roberts v. Canada
This case arose from a dispute between two Indian bands over title
to a certain Indian reserve. The plaintiff band sought a declaration from
the Federal Court that the reserve belonged to it, alleging that the Fed
eral Crown had unlawfully awarded the reserve to the second band, and
thus breached its fiduciary duty to hold the reserve for the plaintiff band .
There was an ancillary claim against the second band for a permanent
injunction restraining it from trespassing on the reserve. The defendant
band applied to have the action against it struck, arguing that the Fed-
eral Court lacked jurisdiction over this branch of the proceeding." The
case, then, presented the problem seen earlier, where a party that is
required to pursue its claim against the Crown in the Federal Court
20 See especially Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6.
21 Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S .C . 1970, c. J-3, s. 20(2).
22 Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1988), 55 D.L.R . (4th) 618 (EC.A.),
where the claim failed because the payment to the province did not discharge a legal
obligation of the federal Crown to maintain juvenile delinquents .
23 Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario (1988), 49 D.L.R . (4th) 759 (Ont . H.C .),
where the claim succeeded.
24 See especially, ibid ., at p . 769. In the event, it has not proved necessary for a
separate claim to be made for contribution between the two levels of government, because
the federal Crown was held not liable to make restitution to the municipality.
225 119891 1 S .C.R . 322, (1989), 57 D.L.R . (4th) 197.
2e This summary of the facts is based on the account given in the judgment of the




under section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act is faced with the argument
that a closely-related claim against a private party cannot be resolved at
the same time .
In ajudgment written for a fourjudgepanel of the Supreme Court,'
Wilson J. rejected the defendant band's argument and dismissed its motion,
effectively holding that the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the entire
claim. She found that section 17(3)(c)" of the Federal Court Act supplied
the statutory basis of the court's jurisdiction, following here the reason-
ing of the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal .29 With respect to the
constitutional requirement flowing from section 101 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, she held that the case was sufficiently founded on federal
law to enable the Federal Court to exercise its statutory jurisdiction .
This was because the action depended upon a federal statute (the Indian
Act), a federal Order in Council setting aside the reserve for one of the
bands, and "the common law of aboriginal title which underlies the
fiduciary obligations of the Crown to both Bands" .3° We shall examine
these holdings more closely in short order. But first, the court's general
approach to the jurisdictional question demands some attention .
(1) The Jurisdictional Test
When can the Federal Court properly assume jurisdiction in a case?
On this point, Wilson J . reiterated the test formulated by McIntyre J. in
the ITO case." This postulates three criteria:
1 . There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament .
2 . There must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposi-
tion of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction .
3 . The law on which the case is based must be "a law of Canada" as the phrase
is used in s . 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 .
This formula is rather puzzling, for, as Wilson J . herself noted, the
third element appears to overlap substantially with the second . That is,
the section 101 requirement, which is the subject of the third branch, is
the direct source of the requirement of "an existing body of federal
law", addressed in the second branch . Nevertheless, Wilson J. suggested
a way of differentiating them:12
27 Dickson C.J.C ., Eeetz, Lamer and Wilson JJ . ; Le Dain J. heard the appeal, but
took no part in the judgment .
2s R.S.C . 1970 (2nd Supp .), c . 10, now renumbered in R.S .C . 1985, c . F-7 as
s . 17(4) .
29 [198712 EC . 535, Hugessen and Urie JJ . ; MacGuigan J . agreed, but also thought
that there was an alternative source of jurisdiction .
30 Supra, footnote 25, at pp . 340 (S .C.R .), 210 (D.L.R .) .
31 ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd . v. Miida Electronics Inc ., supra,
footnote 3, at p . 766 .
32 Supra, footnote 25, at pp . 330-331 (S.C.R .), 203 (D.L.R .) (Emphasis added) .
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[T]he second element, as I understand it, requires a general body offederal law
covering the area of the dispute, i .e ., in this case the law relating to Indians and
Indian interests in reserve lands, and the third element requires that the specific
law which will be resolutive of the dispute be "a law of Canada" within the
meaning of s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 .
With respect, this suggestion merely compounds the original confu-
sion . There seems to be no constitutional or logical rationale for requir-
ing both a general body of federal law covering the area of the dispute,
and a particular federal law dispositive of the dispute. This emerges
clearly later in the decision, where Wilson J . is obliged to merge the
two branches of the test in applying them to the facts of the case .
In reality, the ITO formula is flawed and potentially misleading . It
was originally presented by McIntyre J . as a summary of the criteria laid
down in the Quebec North Shore" andMcNamara Construction 34 cases.
However, as already noted, these decisions support only two general
requirements : (1) there must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the
federal Parliament ; and (2) the action must be founded on existing fed-
eral law, whether statute, regulation, or common law.35
Of course, each branch of this two-fold test has sub-elements which
may require separate treatment in particular instances. For example, the
second requirement demands not only the presence of federal law but
also a strong link between that law and the issues to be decided in the
case . This may, indeed, have been the point that McIntyre J. intended to
make. But to elevate these sub-elements into distinct requirements, as
the ITO formula apparently tries to do, overlooks their essential integrity
and introduces a superfluous and misleading dimension into an area of
the law that has already attracted more than its fair share of confusion .
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems unduly drawn to tripartite
versions of the jurisdictional test . We see further evidence of this ten-
dency in the recent case of Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Explo-
ration Canada Ltd. 36 There La Forest J . stated that the following three
conditions must be satisfied : 37
(a) Parliament has legislative authority over the subject matter of the case ;
(b) the empowering statute confers jurisdiction over the case ; and
(c) the case is governed by "existing and applicable federal law" .
33 Supra, footnote 4.
34 Supra, footnote 5.
35 Quebec North Shore, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1066 ; McNamara Const., supra,
footnote 5, at p. 659.
36 [19891 1 S .C .R . 206.
37 Ibid ., at p. 219. Perhaps Wilson J . had in mind the need for federal legislative
authority over an area when she referred in Roberts to "a general body of federal law".
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Here, it is the first branch of the test that appears superfluous, merely
spelling out a requirement implicit in the third branch . The latter, which
stipulates that the case must be governed by existing federal law, tacitly
requires that the federal law in question be validly enacted by Parliament
or its delegate, or, in the case of federal common law, that it operate
within the federal legislative sphere . In either case, Parliament must
have authority over the subject matter of the action .
(2) The Statutory Requirement: Interpreting Section 17
As seen earlier, the court in Roberts held that a statutory basis for
jurisdiction could be found in section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act."
This states that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over "pro
ceedings to determine disputes where the Crown is or may be under an
obligation, in respect of which there are or may be conflicting claims" .
Wilson J. reasoned thât the Crown had the obligation to hold the reserve
for the use of one of the two Indian bands advancing conflicting claims
to it, and that these facts brought the case squarely within the wording
used in the section. So doing, she rejected the argument that the section
applied only to interpleader proceedings .
Unfortunately, this generous interpretation by the court may not be
of assistance to most litigants seeking to join a co-defendant with the
federal Crown before the Federal Court. For it can be argued that sec
tion 17(3)(c) only applies where there are two or more parties, each
claiming to be the sole beneficiary of the same obligation owed by the
Crown. This limitation could prevent the section from applying to any
but the rarest of cases beyond interpleader proceedings .
Consider a situation which bears some similarity to the case at hand .
An aboriginal nation claims that it has unextinguished aboriginal rights
to lands located within a province, and further, that the federal Crown
has breached its fiduciary duty to ensure that the lands are held for the
benefit of the aboriginal group.. The provincial Crown does not acknowl-
edge this claim, and continues to grant rights over the lands to lumber-
ing and mining interests. The federal Crown, which has jurisdiction over
lands reserved for the Indians under section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, denies that the lands in question fall under its authority, or
that it has any fiduciary responsibilities relating to them . The aboriginal
nation's claim to the land thus has two prongs ; directed respectively at
the provincial Crown and the federal Crown. Since most of the evidence
relevant to one prong of the claim will apply to the other, the entire
claim obviously should be heard a single proceeding . But which court
has jurisdiction?
38 Supra, footnote 28 .
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The claim that the federal Crown has breached its fiduciary obliga-
tions must apparently be pursued in the Federal Court, which by virtue
of section 17(1) has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the fed
eral Crown. But under current case law39 the plaintiff will be unable to
join the provincial Crown as a co-defendant because section 17 does not
enable the Federal Court to grant relief against a province . Worse, inso-
far as the action against the federal Crown requires the court to deter-
mine whether land claimed by the provincial Crown is subject to aborig-
inal rights, there is authority for the proposition that, since the main
burden of such a ruling will fall on the province, the Federal Court
cannot even hear the action against the federal Crown.40
The plaintiff may, of course, seek recourse against the province in
a provincial court, but there it will have to meet the argument that the
federal Crown cannot be joined to the action because of the Federal
Court's exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the federal Crown."
The upshot of this argument would seem to be that the federal Crown
cannot be brought before any court to respond to the substantive claim .
This remarkable result may perhaps be avoided by arguing that, if
the action is not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, the reason
must be that the action is not, in substance, one in which relief is claimed
against the federal Crown. It follows that, even though the federal Crown
is named as a co-defendant, the provincial court has a residual jurisdic-
tion which has not in this instance been displaced by the Federal Court
Act. 42
39 Lubicon Lake Band v. The Queen, [19811 2 EC . 317 (TD.) ; Joe v. Canada
(1983), 49 N.R . 198 (EC.A.), affirmed, [1986] 2 S.C.R . 145.
4° Joe v. Canada, ibid.
41 Ominayak v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. (1987), 44 D.L.R . (4th) 355 (Alta.
Q.B .) .
42 Compare Joe v. Findlay (1978), 87 D.L.R . (3d) 239 (B .C .S .C .), where Berger
J. in obiter dicta stated (at p. 243) that, if it became necessary, the federal Crown could
be joined as a party to litigation in a British Columbia court between a member and an
Indian band ;
Such joinder would simply be for the purpose of having all parties before this court
and avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings . It would not constitute a claim against
the Crown within the meaning of section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act.
See also Uuktiv v. The Queen (B .C.S.C ., February 24, 1986 ; aff'd B .C.C.A ., April 26,
1986), where the federal Crown was added as a co-defendant at the instance of the
province of British Columbia, against which the plaintiffs sought declarations of their
ownership of and jurisdiction over certain lands, and an injunction to restrain further
interference with their rights . The courts were obviously impressed by the desirability of
the federal Crown's being bound by the judgment, because the province might later wish
to claim contribution or indemnity from the federal Government . However, it is difficult
to determine the precise basis for the conclusion that section 17(1) did not exclude the
British Columbia courts' jurisdiction to add the federal Crown as a defendant . The expla-




oes section 17(3)(c), as interpreted in Roberts, provide an alterna-
tive escape route from this maze? It could be argued that our example
involves conflicting claims with respect to an obligation owed by the
Crown within the section's meaning. That is, the aboriginal nation claims
that the federal Crown has breached its fiduciary obligations regarding
the land, while the provincial Crown effectively denies this, claiming
that the land belongs to it alone. The difficulty with this argument,
however, is that the provincial government clearly does not assert that
the federal Crown owes it a fiduciary obligation in respect of the land .
By contrast, in Roberts both plaintiff and defendant bands claimed to be
the true beneficiary of the Crown's fiduciary obligation . That is they
both claimed the benefit of the same obligation . So, if section 17(3)(c)
only applies where there are multiple parties each claiming sole benefit
of a federal obligation, the section cannot help resolve the puzzle posed
by our example.
More promising is the approach to section 17(1) taken by Reed J.
in Marshall v. The Queen,43 which in Roberts won the acceptance of
Joyal J . at first instance" and also of MacGuigan J. in the Court of
Appeal.' This permits a co-defendant to be joined to proceedings in the
Federal Court against the federal Crown when the two claims are "so
intertwined that findings of fact with respect to one defendant are inti-
mately bound up with those that would have to be made with respect to
the other" .46 This approach to the statutory grant of jurisdiction is, of
course, similar to that rejected in earlier jurisprudence in respect of the
constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction .4' The rationale in both con-
texts is the obvious efficiency and fairness of deciding in one proceed-
ing all the claims arising from a common factual matrix .
This broader interpretation of section 17(1) finds support in the
provision's wording. As Reed J . pointed out,4$ the section gives the
tions, and the principal relief sought was a declaration ; see the B.C . Law Society case, at
footnotes 3 and 91 . However, not all the issues in the case were constitutional, and the
plaintiffs were seeking a declaration of right, not a Dyson -type declaration of invalidity .
See also Beauvais v. The Queen, [1982] 1 F.C . 171, at p. 179 (TD.), where Walsh
J. suggested that it would be "manifestly contrary to natural justice to conclude that no
court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction against the Band Council, if on the facts
such an injunction is justified and necessary" .
43 (1986) 1 FC . 437, at p. 449 (TD.) .
44 [1987) 1 EC . 155, at p. 167 (TD.) .
45 [198712 EC. 535, at pp . 545-546 (C .A .) .
46 Supra, footnote 43 .
47 Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6 .
4s Supra, footnote 43, at pp . 447-448, where Reed J. neutralized the presumption
of statutory interpretation that, as a mere statutory court, the Federal Court's jurisdiction
was to be strictly construed, with the "large and liberal" purposive presumption con-
tained now in the Interpretation Act, R.S.C . 1985, c . 1-21, s . 12 .
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Federal Court jurisdiction in all cases where relief is claimed against the
federal Crown, rather than simply over all claims against the federal
Crown .'9 In other words, the statute is construed as providing that, when
a claim is made against the federal Crown, the Federal Court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the whole case, including claims against other
co-defendants that are so closely related that, as a matter of justice and
convenience, they should be decided in a single proceeding .
The Supreme Court's decision in Roberts represents an important
advance toward the acceptance of the Marshall doctrine . While Wilson
J. stopped short of basing her judgment on the doctrine, she apparently
gave it her blessing . After quoting at some length from the judgment of
Reed J ., she stated : 5o
There is clearly a substantial policy component involved in the resolution of
this jurisdictional problem. Practical considerations enter in and concern over the
undue extension of federal court jurisdiction where the federal Crown is not the
sole defendant has to be balanced against the need for the expeditious resolution of
litigation at reasonable cost . Marshall seems to strike an appropriate balance by
requiring the claim or claims against the private litigant to be inextricably linked
with those against the Crown. In addition, where such link exists serious problems
of res judicata which could arise in subsequent litigation in the provincial courts
are avoided.
In the event, she found it unnecessary to resolve the issue definitively,
and upheld the Federal Court's jurisdiction solely under section 17(3)(c) .
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court was not prepared to settle a
matter of such practical importance, which has divided the judges of the
Federal Court. Indeed, only four months before the Supreme Court heard
Roberts, the Federal Court of Appeal in Varnam v. Canada5 ' decisively,
but "not without regret" ,5Z brought down the kite that Reed, Joyal and
MacGuigan JJ . had been bravely flying . The court found that the weight
of previous authority was against the broader approach to section 17(1),
and that the concept of "intertwining" was too vague a basis upon
which to build a jurisdiction that was not clearly conferred by the word-
ing of the statute . 53 Varnam was not mentioned in the Roberts judgment .
49 Reed L's construction of s . 17(I) echoes the interpretation of the constitutional
scope of federal jurisdiction in the United States :
It has long been held, however, that the Article III grant is broader than merely a
grant over federal "claims" but encompasses all claims in "cases" arising under
federal law.
(Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc. . 611 F.2d 474, at p. 478 (3d Cir. 1979)) .
5° Supra, footnote 25, at pp . 333 (S.C.R .), 204-205 (D.L.R .) .
51 [19881 2 FC . 454 (C.A .) .
52 Ibid ., at p. 461 (per Hugessen J.) .
53 The other objection raised in Varncnn to the Federal Court's jurisdiction was that
the tort allegedly committed by the co-defendant, the College of Physicians and Sur-
geons of British Columbia, was not sufficiently related to a breach of a federal statutory
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It will presumably only be a matter of time before the issue returns to
the Supreme Court, 54
When a serious jurisdictional doubt is raised in the course of litiga-
tion, it is generally better for the court to clarify the law then and .there,
rather than postpone deciding the question until some future case . More
over, the jurisdictional point at stake here is relatively self-contained,
and has been adequately defined in litigation over several years. In this
respect, Roberts recalls the older style of Supreme Court judgment which
generally sought to avoid deciding anything but the narrowest point needed
to dispose of a case . Ironically, Wilson J. often seems to go out of her
way, especially in Charter cases, to address a wide range of issues,
sometimes in very expansive terms. 15
(3) The Constitutional Requirement
Wilson J. affirmed the doctrine that the Federal Court may only
exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if the parties' rights are squarely
founded on existing federal law. She rejected the test formulated by L,e
ain J. in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Bensol Customs
Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada,56 where he said :s'
It should be sufficient in my opinion if the rights and obligations of the parties are
to be determined to some material extent by federal law. It should not be necessary
that the cause of action be one that is created by federal law so long as it is one
affected by it .
Wilson J. likened this approach to that adopted in the United States,
where federal courts have been held to possess jurisdiction over ques-
tions and parties not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because they
are pendent or ancillary to a claim that clearly is within federal jurisdic-
tion . While conceding that this was in some ways an attractive concept,
duty to satisfy the constitutional requirement that parties' rights must be founded on
federal law. The court found no error in the trial judge's refusal to strike the claim on
this ground . The application of the Rhine and Prytula test (supra, footnotes 13 and 14),
has proved difficult to apply in tort actions . For a liberal approach see, for example,
Oag v. Canada, [1987] 2 FC. 511; Bradasch v. Canada (FC.T.D ., March 1, 1989, doe.
no . 7-773-788) ; Kigowa v. Canada (FC.TD., July 28, 1989, doe. no . 7-612-689) . The
continuing validity of the narrower approach adopted in Stephens' Estate v. Minister of
National Revenue (1982), 40 N.R. 620 (F.CA.), must now be regarded as dubious.
54 Varnam has been applied in Wilder v. Canada (EC.A ., June 7, 1988, doe. no .
A-1005-1087) . However, the question will become much less important if Bill C-38 is
enacted; see infra, pp, 840-841 .
55 Wilson J.'s judgments that come to mind in this context include Operation Dis-
mantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R . 441; R. v. Jones, [198612 S.C.R . 284; R. v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S .C.R . 30 .
5e [1979] 2 F.C . 575 (C.A.) .
57 Ibid ., at p. 583 . (Emphasis added by Wilson J. when citing it in Roberts, supra,
footnote 50, at pp . 333 (S.C.R.), 205 (D.L.R.)) .
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she concluded that it "does not appear to find support in the existing
jurisprudence of this Court, nor indeed in the wording of s . 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 ".58
Nevertheless, Wilson J . went on to find that in the case at hand the
plaintiffs' claim was based exclusively on existing federal law. She iden-
tified three sources of law governing the right to possess the reserve: (1)
the salient provisions of the Indian Act; (2) the federal executive act
setting aside the reserve for one of the bands; and (3) the common law
relating to aboriginal title which underlies the Crown's fiduciary obliga-
tions . While the first two sources of law were clearly federal, the third
required closer consideration .
Wilson J. began by considering the argument, accepted by Hugessen
J. in the Court of Appeal, 59 that the law of aboriginal title qualified as
federal law because Parliament had exclusive authority over "Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians".' In reaching this conclusion, Hugessen
J, had invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Derrick-son v. Derrick-son,"
where Chouinard J . held that the right to possess Indian reserve lands
fell solely within federal legislative competence, and further was immune
from the application of provincial law, by way of exception to the gen-
eral constitutional doctrine that there are no exclusive federal "enclaves" .62
However, in Wilson J.'s opinion, the Derrickson ruling did not lead
necessarily to the conclusion that the law governing Indian lands was
"federal law" . She stated : 63
58 Supra, footnote 25, at pp . 334 (S .C .R .), 205 (D.L.R .) . We are puzzled by Wilson
J.'s statement at the conclusion of her discussion of Marshall and Bensol that "[w]hether
the Federal Court could, in this case, entertain the claim of the Plaintiff Band pursuant
to s . 17(1) without at least implicitly adopting a pendent and ancillary jurisdiction approach
is a question which need not be answered in this case" (at pp. 334 (S .C.R .), 206 (D.L.R .) .
The difficulty is that Wilson J. described, and rejected, the American pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction doctrine as a method of expanding the constitutional requirement that
cases in the Federal Court must be founded on federal law. However, Wilson J . also held
that, in the present case . federal law provided the sole basis for the plaintiffs' rights ;
therefore, adopting the Marshall approach to s. 17(1) could not require accepting the
pendent and ancillary approach to the constitutional limitations on the Federal Court's
jurisdiction . Nor does it follow that the adoption of Marshall logically, or as a matter of
policy, necessarily requires the approval of Bensol .
59 Supra, footnote 45, at pp . 539-540.
60 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) .
61 [19861 1 S .C.R . 285, at p. 296,
62 See P Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed ., 1985), pp . 558-560; Air
Canada v. British Columbia, [19891 1 S.C.R . 1161 . But compare Bisaillou v. Keable,
[198312 S.C.R . 60, at pp . 104-109, where the court held that in criminal proceedings
the rule regarding the protection given to the identity of police informers was paramount
over any provincial statute, even though Parliament had not given the common law rule
a statutory basis.




While I do not question the soundness of Chouinard J.'s conclusion that provincial
legislation cannot apply to Indian lands because of the exclusive federal legislative
power . . ., it does not, in my view, address the issue before us which is : is the
law of aboriginal title a "law of Canada" within the meaning of s. 101?
Taking up that issue, Wilson J . observed that federal law was not
confined to federal legislation, but also included federal common law.
The precise question to be resolved, then, was "whether the law of
aboriginal title is federal common law" ." Her answer is worth quoting
in full :65
I believe that it is . In Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia ,66 this
Court recognized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic
occupation and possession of their tribal lands . As Dickson J. (as he then was)
pointed out in Guerin,67 aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the British and
survived British claims of sovereignty. The Indians' right of occupation and pos-
session continued as a "burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign" : per
Viscount Haldane in Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary) . 68 while, as
was made clear in.Guerin, s . 18(1) of the Indian Act did not create the unique
relationship between the Crown and the Indians, it certainly incorporated it into
federal law by affirming that "reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and
benefit of the respective bands for which they were set apart" .
The passage, at first sight, seems to attempt the tricky manoeuvre
of changing horses in mid-stream, seizing the tail of a passing statutory
pony from a perch in a common law saddle . Closer examination sug
gests, however, that Wilson J . is really making two distinct points : first,
the common law of aboriginal title qualifies as federal common law in
its own right because of its particular nature and origins; and second, in
any case, the special fiduciary relationship flowing from aboriginal title
has been incorporated into federal statute law by the Indian Act. ®n
either count, then, the law can be considered federal .
This interpretation is supported by Wilson J.'s final summary:69
I would conclude therefore that "laws of Canada" are exclusively required
for the disposition of this appeal, namely the relevant provisions of the Indian Act,
the act of the federal executive pursuant to the Indian Act in setting aside the
reserve in issue for the use and occupancy of one or other of the two claimant
Bands, and the common law of aboriginal title which underlies the fiduciary obli-
gations of the Crown to both Bands .
This passage clearly identifies the common law of aboriginal title as








Ibid ., at pp . 340 (S.C .R .), 210 (D.L.R .) .
Ibid .
[19731 S .C.R . 313.
Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R . 335 .
[1921] 2 A.C . 399, at p. 403 (RC .) .
Supra, footnote 25, at pp . 340 (S.C .R .), 210 (D.L.R.) .
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What is the precise basis of this holding? Thejudgment is far from
being explicit on this point. But the rationale appears to be as follows.
As Wilson J. noted, the common law of aboriginal title arose from the
very process whereby the Crown assumed sovereignty over Canada . As
a result, it took force uniformly throughout the various colonial territories
that now make up Canada, applying alike in jurisdictions otherwise based
on English and French law. Upon Confederation, this body of common
law passed into the federal sphere of authority by virtue of section 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867 . In this manner, the common law of aborig-
inal title-and indeed the common law governing aboriginal and treaty
rights generally-became federal common law. 7' To put the point pre-
cisely, it became a body of basic public law operating uniformly across
the country within the federal sphere of competence . In this respect,
then, the law of aboriginal rights resembles the law of Crown liability,
which Laskin C.J.C . earlier singled out as a prime example of federal
common law."
Federal Jurisdiction And The Charter
As a result of the Supreme Court's previous assaults on federal
jurisdiction, the most troublesome feature of the Federal Court Act has
been the exclusiveness of much of the jurisdiction granted to the Federal
Court. In two distinct lines of cases, the Charter has become the focus
of attempts to restore a concurrent jurisdiction to provincial courts .
(1) Crown Litigation.
Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers
Construction Ltd., a case currently under appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada, is representative of the first line of authorities . The litigation
arose from a dispute among the federal Crown, its contractor, Zutphen,
and a sub-contractor, Dywidag, about the respective liability of the par-
ties for loss suffered by Dywidag in performing its sub-contract . Dywidag
brought an action in the Federal Court against the Crown, and a separate
7° For fuller development of these points, see B. Slattery, Understanding Aborigi-
nal Rights (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, especially at pp . 736-741 .
7 ' See Quebec North Shore, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1063, where Laskin C.J .C .
stated :
It should be recalled that the law respecting the Crown came into Canada as part of
the public or constitutional law of Great Britain, and there can be no pretence that
that law is provincial law. In so far as there is a common law associated with the
Crown's position as a litigant it is federal law in relation to the Crown in right of
Canada . just as it is provincial law in relation to the Crown in right of a Province,
and is subject to modification in each case by the competent Parliament or Legislature .
See, further, McNamara Construction, supra. footnote 5, at p. 662.
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proceeding in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia against Zutphen. Zutphen
and the Crown each took the position that, if it were held liable to
Dywidag, it would claim an indemnity from the other. Since the Crown
was unable to issue a third party notice against Zutphen in the Federal
Court proceeding,72 Zutphen sought to add the Crown as a third party to
the provincial court action, in an effort to prevent a multiplicity of pro-
ceedings . Zutphen argued that the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over claims against the Crown infringed the subject's rights under the
Charter.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal73 granted Zutphen leave to add
the Crown as a third party. It held that a statutory scheme under which
the Crown could sue a subject in a provincial court but could not itself
be sued by a subject was a denial of equality contrary to section 15 of
the Charter, which could not be justified under section 1 .
It is certainly easy to sympathize with the sense of frustration pro-
voked in lower courts by the injustices and inefficiencies resulting from
the Supreme Court's narrow view of federal jurisdiction . However, it
would be rash to predict that the Supreme Court will uphold the reason-
ing in Zutphen Brothers. Courts in other jurisdictions have generally
held that the Crown and its subjects are not comparable for the purpose
of section 15 . 74 Indeed, in two cases, the broad immunity of the federal
Crown from suit outside the Federal Court has been specifically upheld.'
Nonetheless, this particular difficulty can be surmounted by refor-
mulating the argument . The contention would be that, by barring pro-
ceedings against the federal Crown in provincial courts, Parliament has
meted out unequal and prejudicial treatment to plaintiffs suing the fed-
eral Crown, in the specific case where their claim involves multiple
defendants . They alone, among plaintiffs with claims against multiple
defendants, cannot have their case heard in a single court proceeding,
but are obliged to resort to complex and costly litigation before a variety
?6of courts .
72 See, Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6.
73 (1988), 35 D.L.R . (4th) 433 (N.S .S.C . App. Div.) .
74 See, for example, R. v Stoddart (1987), 37 C.C.C . (3d) 351 (Ont . C.A .) ; Wright
v. Canada (A.G.) (1987), 46 D.L.R . (4th) 182 (Ont . Div. Ct.) ; Leighton v. Canada,
[19891 1 EC . 75, at pp . 82-83 (TD .) .
75 Ominayak v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. (1987), 44 D.L.R . (4th) 355 (Alta.
Q.B .) ; Rudolf Wolf & Co . Ltd. v. The Queen (1987), 10 A.C.WS . 217 (Ont . H.C .J .),
affirmed (March 7, 1988, Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted
(1988), 30 O.A .C . 77 .
76 Indeed, counsel for Zutphen seems also to have put the argument in this way:
supra, footnote 73, at p. 444. See also, Colangelo v. Mississauga (City) (1988), 53
D.L.R . (4th) 283, at pp . 296-297 (Ont . C.A.) ; Peaker v. Canada Post Corp . (1989), 68
O.R . (2d) 8, at pp . 14-17 (H.C .J .) ; cf., Suche v. The Queen (1987), 37 D.L.R . (4th)
474, at p. 484, where this argument was applied to s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights .
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Even in this form, however, the argument may be problematical in
the particular circumstances of the Zutphen Brothers case . The difficulty
arises from the decision in Andrews v. LawSociety ofBritish Colunibia, 77
where the Supreme Court suggested that the main thrust of section 15
was to protect the politically, socially and economically disadvantaged
from discrimination by virtue of their personal characteristics.78 The ques-
tion, then, is whether persons who have been wronged by the federal
Crown, and are required to pursue their claims in potentially costly and
cumbersome proceedings, meet this description. On the one hand, it can
be argued that individuals with grievances against the Crown have his-
torically been placed in a position of disadvantage relative to other liti-
gants, and that section 17(1) perpetuates and reinforces that position of
disadvantage . The argument may be particularly strong where the plain-
tiffs belong to a group which has suffered discrimination on other grounds,
such as aboriginal peoples. On the other hand, it may be said that the
fact that the federal Crown is a potential defendant cannot be a personal
characteristic of the plaintiffs who allege that section 17(l) of the Fed-
eral Court Act discriminates against them. In addition, the procedural
difficulties and inconveniences associated with suits against the Crown
are arguably not the kinds of historical disadvantage contemplated by
section 15, especially since there is no reason to believe that the other-
wise socially vulnerable are disproportionately represented in this class
of litigants .
Nonetheless, the disposition of the appeal in Zutphen Brothers should
not necessarily be regarded as a foregone conclusion . The court's previ-
ous eagerness to take the constitutional knife to pare the scope of federal
jurisdiction suggests that it may be willing to use the Charter to remove
what is arguably the most immediate cause of litigants' problems with
the Federal Court: the exclusiveness of its jurisdiction . However, the
problem may be better framed as one of procedural fairness rather than
of equality. The essence of the complaint in Zutphen is surely that Par-
liament has denied litigants a fair hearing by preventing them from
bringing their case before a court with jurisdiction to dispose of all related
claims arising out of it .
Section 7 of the Charter is not of assistance in Zutphen Brothers
because the plaintiff had not been deprived of life, liberty and security
of the person . However, section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights
77 [19891 1 S .C.R . 143 .
78 See, ibid ., especially at pp . 152-153, 174-175, but note the broader approach of
La Forest J., at pp . 194-196. See also Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983
(Nfld.), ss . 32, 34 (1989) . 56 D.L.R . (4th) 756 (S.C.C .) . For an argument supporting
judicial intervention under the Charter to restore injured workers' rights to sue in tort,
see D . Beatty, Shop Talk: Conversations about the Constitutionality of Our Labour Law




appears more promising . It seems plausible to argue that, by preventing
the joinder of all defendants and the resolution of all relevant claims
between the parties, section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act deprives a
party "of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations" .
It is, of course, true that "a fair hearing" normally connotes a
procedure that affords to those affected the essential participatory rights
of parties at a trial or, where appropriate, an appeal before a court of
law. It could hardly be said that section 17(1) deprived the plaintiff in
Zutphen of a fair hearing in this sense .79 However, the fair hearing guar-
anteed by section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights is one that accords with "the
principles of fundamental justice" . This latter phrase has been given an
expansive meaning in the context of section 7 of the Charter, where,
admittedly, it appears in its own right, and not as a modifier of a require-
ment of a fair hearing .
There is already some evidence to suggest that the introduction of
the Charter has sparked a judicial revival of the Fill of Rights . `3 It seems
arguable that, where appropriate, the interpretation given to words in the
Charter should shape the meaning that the same words have in the Bill
of Rights . For present purposes, the most relevant decision may be
Morgentaler v. The Queen, 81 where it was said that, under section 7 of
the Charter, the procedural arrangements in the Criminal Code for the
approval of abortions had to meet minimal standards of efficiency, expe-
ditiousness and functional aptness." If this reasoning can be extended to
other decision-making contexts, it seems plausible to argue that, by pre-
venting the disposition of related claims in a single proceeding, section
17(1) results in the denial of a fair hearing in accordance with the princi-
ples of fundamental justice, contrary to section 2(e)) of the Bill of Rights .
This argument was rejected summarily by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Danard v. The Queen, 83 essentially on the ground that the Federal
Court Act and the Crown Liability Act actually created the right to sue
the Crown. The statutory limitations upon the forum for its enforcement
79 See, however, Beauvais v . The Queen, [1982] 1 FC. 171, at p . 179 (TD.),
where it was said that to conclude that neither the provincial court nor the Federal Court
could enjoin an Indian Band Council was "manifestly contrary to natural justice" .
so Singh v. Minister ofEmployment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 ; MacBain
v. Lederman, [19851 1 FC. 856 (C .A .) ; In re Immigration Act, 1976 and In re Kahlon,
[1985] 2 FC . 124 (TD.); National Anti-Poverty Organization v. Canada (A.G .) (1988),
21 FTR. 33 ; however, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision on May 15,
1989, and leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court of Canada, Nov. 23, 1989 .
$1 Morgentaler v. The Queen ., [1988] 1 S.C.R . 30 ; see also, Wilson v. Medical
Services Commn . of B.C . (1988), 53 D.L.R . (4th) 171, at pp . 196-198 (B .C.C.A .) .
82 Ibid., esp . a t pp . 61-63, 121-122 .
83 (1984), 14 D.L.R . (4th) 124 (Ont . C.A .) .
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thus regulated its exercise, rather than deprived the plaintiff of a hear-
ing. A similar argument can be found in American constitutional law in
the context of the Due Process clause . The doctrine is described as requir-
ing claimants "to take the bitter with the sweet" ." The standard riposte
is that, while the constitution may not require the legislature to create a
right, if one is created, the statutory procedure for resolving disputes
must meet the standards of procedural fairness required by the constitution ."
The Supreme Court of Canada has been prepared to give section 7
of the Charter an expansive interpretation in connection with the admin-
istration of justice, as an area for which the courts have particular
responsibility8' Given the judicial role in creating the imbroglio surrounding
the law of federal jurisdiction, section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights may
suggest itself to the court as an appropriate means of restoring a little
sanity and order.
(2) Charter Challenges to Federal Administrative Action
A successful use of the Charter or the Bill of Rights to remove the
exclusiveness of the Federal Court's jurisdiction under section 17(1) may
thus enable all the related claims arising from a common set of facts to
be decided in a single piece of litigation . However, the Charter may
have a much less beneficial effect upon the Court's virtually exclusive
jurisdiction to subject federal administrative agencies to judicial review.87
As matters stand, this area of federal jurisdiction possesses a rare
degree of coherence . The Supreme Court has accepted that, under sec-
tion 101, Parliament may withdraw the function of reviewing federal
administrative bodies from the superior courts of the provinces, at least
when review is not sought on constitutional grounds.$$ And, generally
speaking, defining the jurisdictional boundaries between the two branches
of our court system has proved far less troublesome in administrative
law than in civil litigation involving the federal Crown . It is interesting
to note, however, that the fact that Indian band councils may derive their
authority from customary law, as well as from federal statute, has raised
doubts about the reviewability of their decisions under section 18 of the
Federal Court Act.89
" See especially the dissenting judgment of Rehnquist J. in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S . 134 (1974) .
as Cf., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S . 565, at pp . 572-575 (1975) .
86 See, in particular, Reference re Section 94(2) ofthe Motor Vehicle Act, [198512
S.C.R . 486 .
$7 Section 18 of the Federal Court Act is the key provision.
ss Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L'Anglais Inc ., [ 1983] 1 S .C.R . 147, at
p . 154 .
sy Thus, in Isaac v. Bédard, (1974] S.C.R . 1349, at pp . 1378-1381, Laskin J. in a
dissenting judgment doubted whether even a band council elected under s . 74 of the
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This state of relative harmony may be short-lived. Looming on the
horizon is the question whether Charter challenges to federal administra-
tive action enjoy the same exemption from exclusive federal jurisdiction
as challenges based on the constitutional division of powers . The point
has arisen in a number of cases, but the courts have not yet provided a
clear answer.9°
The background to the issue lies in two earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions. In Attorney Generalfor Canada v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia"
and its sequel, Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L'Anglais Inc., 92
the Supreme Court held that parliament could not give the Federal Court
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity or applica-
bility of federal legislation under the division of powers . 93 Thus, a party
to a certification proceeding before the Canada Labour Relations Board
Indian Act was a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" for the purpose of s. 18
of the Federal Court Act on the ground that it "has some resemblance to the board of
directors of a corporation" (at p. 1379); despite the width of the definition of federal
tribunals contained in s. 2(g), non-governmental bodies were not included in s . 18, even
though they may possess powers conferred by federal legislation . In the alternative, he
held, the band simply assumed jurisdiction over Mrs. Bridard by virtue of customary
law; it did not purport to exercise any statutory power.
Nonetheless, it has since been held in the Federal Court, and provincial courts, that
band councils (but not bands) fall within s. 18 : see, for example, Sabattis v. Oromocto
Indian Band (1986), 32 D.L.R . (4th) 680 (N.B .C.A.) ; Beauvais v. The Queen, supra,
footnote 79 ; Trotchie v. The Queen, [1981] 2 C.N.L.R . 147 (FC.TD.) . Indeed, in
affirming the Trial Division's judgment in Gabriel v. Canatonquin, [1978] 1 EC . 124,
Pratte J. said there was no merit in the appellants' contention that the Federal Court
lacked jurisdiction because the subject-matter of the dispute, the validity of an election
of the band council, was governed by customary law, not federal statute: [1980] 2 F.C .
792, at p. 793.
90 See, for example, Re Lavers and Minister of Finance (1985), 18 D.L.R . (4th)
477 (B .C.S .C .) (upholding provincial superior courts' jurisdiction in Charter cases) ; Re
Bassett and Government of Canada (1987), 35 D.L.R . (4th) 537 (Sask. C.A.) (jurisdic
tion assumed without discussion : B .C . Law Society, infra., footnote 91, applied to divi-
sion of powers point) ; Re Gandam and Minister ofEmployment andImmigration (1982),
140 D.L.R . (3d) 363 (Sask. Q.B .) ; Pecheries MPQ Ltée v. Hache (1986), 25 D.L.R .
(4th) 66 (N.B .Q.B .) (upholding exclusive Federal Courtjurisdiction when Charter ques-
tion raised in proceeding otherwise within its jurisdiction) ; Le Groupe des éleveurs de
volailles de l'Est de l'Ontario v. Chicken Marketing Agency, [1985] 1 EC . 280, at
pp . 303-304 (TD .) (doubtful) .
91 [198212 S.C.R . 307.
92 Supra, footnote 88 .
93 Even though the Constitution is not a "law of Canada" for the purposes of
s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Federal Court may decide constitutional ques-
tions relating to the administration of an otherwise valid federal statute which arise in
proceedings to review a federal agency . However, since only valid federal laws count as
"laws of Canada", the Federal Court paradoxically may not have jurisdiction to enter-
tain a challenge to the validity of the statute in its entirety. See further, Northern Telecom
Canada Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada, [1983] 1 S.C .R . 733 .
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may go to a provincial court to challenge the Board's jurisdiction on the
ground that the employees in question are engaged in an entirely provin-
cial work or undertaking.
Questions about the constitutional division of powers arise compar-
atively rarely in connection with the operation of federal regulatory schemes
or the authority of federal tribunals . The decisions in British Columbia
Law Society and Paul L'Anglais seem therefore to have made relatively
few inroads into the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction to review
most federal administrative action . However, the Court's role would be
seriously eroded if its jurisdiction over Charter challenges to federal
administration were also held to be concurrent with that of provincial
courts .
This could mean, for instance, that inmates of federal penitentiaries
could elect between the Federal Court and a provincial court when invok-
ing the Charter to challenge decisions of either prison disciplinary tribu
nals or the National Parole Board. A similar choice would be available
to unsuccessful claimants for refugee status, or other persons refused
entry into Canada or subject to deportation under the Immigration Act .
The loss of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the areas of immigration and
refugee law would enable litigants to avoid the cleverly drafted limita-
tions on judicial review contained in the new amendments to the Immi-
gration Act. 94
It is fair to point out that the Supreme Court's recent expansion of
the scope of habeas corpus has already made, important inroads into the
Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction to review federal tribunals with
power over personal liberty, even on non-constitutional grounds . 9' How-
ever, Charter-protected rights that potentially may be affected by a regu-
latory scheme or administrative action obviously extend well beyond the
interest in personal liberty that is protected by habeas corpus . Examples
might include claims that a social benefit limited to particular groups
violates section 15, or that a site inspection or a demand for information
by administrative officers is an unreasonable search contrary to section
8. Also affected would be claims that the principles of fundamental
justice are breached by a federal tribunal that is insufficiently indepen-
94 R.S.C . 1985, c. I-2, ss . 83 .1-85 .1 (as added by S.C . 1988, c. 35, s. 20). It
could, perhaps, be argued that these provisions so restrict a litigant's access to the
Federal Court to vindicate a Charter right that they are in themselves unconstitutional .
See also, Peiroo, infra, footnote 95 .
95 SeeR. v. Miller, [19851 2 S.C.R . 613 : this and the companion cases of Morin v.
SHUReview Committee, 1198512 S .C .R . 662, and Cardinal v. Director ofKent Institu-
tion, [1985] 2 S .C.R . 643, are discussed by J.M . Evans, Developments in Administra
tive Law: the 1985-86 Term (1987), 9 S.C.L.R . 1, at pp . 14-20; see also, R. v. Gamble,
[1987] 2 S .C.R . 595. The Federal Court has no general statutory jurisdiction to issue the
writ of habeas corpus . See, however, Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and




dent of the interested department, or is saddled with an institutional
design or procedure hopelessly inappropriate to its functions.
There is an attractive simplicity in the view that the Constitution is
the Constitution, and that if the Federal Court cannot be given exclusive
jurisdiction over division of powers questions, the same holds for the
Charter. However, there are substantial arguments on the other side .
First, when federal legislation is challenged on division of powers
grounds, it is clearly desirable that there should be an opportunity for
disputes to be filtered through courts composed ofjudges appointed from
the Bar of the province, for this gives some assurance that the strength
of the provincial interest will be fully appreciated . This kind of consid-
eration is irrelevant in Charter cases, where the appropriate level of
government is not in issue .
Second, the Charter grounds invoked in attacking the proceedings
of a federal tribunal will often be closely related to standard administra-
tive law arguments. Consider, for example, the double-barrelled argu
ment that a federal agency failed to comply with the common law duty
of fairness or, in the alternative, violated the principles of fundamental
justice enshrined in section 7 of the Charter. 97 If litigants were allowed
to pursue the Charter argument in a provincial superior court, when the
administrative law issue could normally only be decided in the Federal
Court, a serious dilemma would arise. Should the provincial court decide
the Charter issue, simply because everyone has the constitutional right
to raise such issues in provincial courts? Or should it stay the proceed-
ing pending the Federal Court's disposition of an application for review,
on the ground that, since only the Federal Court can dispose of both
Charter and non-Charter issues, it is the more appropriate forum? Or
should the provincial court assert a pendent jurisdiction to decide both
issues itself, since they are intertwined and arise from a common core of
fact?
Experience to date with fragmented jurisdiction makes it easy to
imagine the tangle into which the law would be drawn if Paul L'Anglais
were extended to Charter issues . Only the most compelling reasons of
constitutional policy should induce the courts to subvert the legislative
to refuse a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that, despite the need for leave, an
application under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act provided an equally effective remedy ;
moreover, the review provisions of the Immigration Act constituted a complete code,
which the courts should not permit to be by-passed lightly by applications to the provin-
cial court for habeas corpus .
96 Supra, footnotes 81 and 82 .
97 An important example is Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution Inmate Disci-
plinary Court, (198412 F.C . 642 (C.A.) ; appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dis-
missed for moomess, [1987] 2 S .C.R . 687
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decision to give the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over broad areas
of federal public law.
Reform
If the Supreme Court of Canada is not yet prepared to hoist the
Federal Court out of the jurisdictional pit in which it now finds itself,
are the prospects of a legislative rescue any brighter? In fact, reforming
the Federal Court Act has been on the agenda of the Justice Department
for some years, but more pressing issues of constitutional law and pol-
icy always seem to have taken precedence . However, on September 28,
1989 the House of Commons gave first reading to Bill C-38, an Act to
amend the Federal Court Act, the Crown Liability Act, the Supreme
Court Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.
The Bill rejects the suggestion emanating from some quarters that
the Federal Court should be abolished.98 Instead, it removes many of the
troubling jurisdictional problems that have plagued the Court, without
abandoning the essentials of the original scheme: a federal court with
jurisdiction over broad areas of federal public law and other matters
within Parliamentary competence . Of immediate relevance is clause 3,
which amends section 17(1) and (2) so as to make the jurisdiction of
the Federal Court concurrent in all cases where relief is claimed against
the federal Crown, except where otherwise expressly provided .
The effect of this amendment is to enable plaintiffs with a claim
against the federal Crown to proceed against all possible defendants in a
provincial court, where the federal Crown, as defendant, will be able to
counter-claim or issue a third-party notice . The fact that one court in a
single proceeding will be able to dispose of all claims arising from the
same transaction will be of great value to both Crown and subject. The
potential advantages to the Crown are specifically protected by clause
16 . This provides that, in proceedings in the Federal Court against the
federal Crown, the court, on the application of the Attorney General of
Canada, shall stay the matter if the Crown wishes to make either a
counter-claim or a third party claim that is outside the court's jurisdic-
tion . If Bill C-38 is enacted before the Supreme Court of Canada decides
Zutphen Brothers99 and Rudolph Wolff, I°° these appeals will presumably
become moot .
Welcome as it is, Bill C-38 is not a panacea. Private litigants suing
the federal Crown may still be faced with a difficult choice . On the one
hand, they may be tempted to institute their claim in the Federal Court
'8 See, for example, the speech of the Attorney General of British Columbia, Mr.
Bud Smith, reported in Lawyers Weekly, September 1, 1989 .
99 Supra, footnote 73 .
100 Supra, footnote 75 .
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because, for instance, they can get a much earlier date for trial than in a
provincial court. On the other hand, the possibility that the Crown may
apply for a stay to enable it to pursue a counter-claim or a claim against
a third party may make this course of action risky, given the additional
delays and costs entailed . lot Note that it will not be possible to hedge
one's bets by instituting a claim against the Crown in a provincial court
while proceedings in respect of the same cause of action are pending in
the Federal Court."
It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the Bill's impor-
tant reforms to the exclusive administrative law jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Court.'°3 Suffice it to say that significant improvements in the oper-
ation of the court should result from the introduction of a statutory rem-
edy of judicial review âi both levels of the Federal Court, with its own
statutory grounds and standing requirement. Other welcome changes include
the power to grant interim relief, the slightly expanded definition of
"federal board, commission or other tribunal", and the assignment to
the Trial Division of the task of reviewing at first instance most federal
administrative bodies . The responsibility for ensuring that the Charter
does not further fragment the Federal Court's jurisdiction in this area
will now rest squarely with the courts .
Finally, the, Fill has not resolved the question left open in koberts' °4
of whether the Federal Court has a statutory jurisdiction over parties
joined as co-defendants with the federal Crown, where their liability is
founded in federal law and arises out of essentially the same facts. 1-
low-ever;if a plaintiff is always free to take proceedings against all co-defendants
in a provincial court; the practical significance of the question is greatly
reduced.
101 However, a plaintiff whose proceeding in the Federal Court is stayed need not
suffer the further prejudice of the continued running of the limitation period if either
proceeding is recommenced in the appropriate provincial court within one hundred days
after the stay. See clause 16, adding a new s . 50 .1(3)' to the Federal Court Act .
' °2 Clause 28, amending and renumbering as s . 21(2) what is currently s . 21(3) of
the Crown Liability Act . On the propriety in other contexts of the grant of a stay because
proceedings are pending in the Federal Court, see, for example, Shell Canada Ltd . v. St .
Lawrence Seaway Authority (1987), 58 O .R . (2d) 437 (H.C.J .) ; cf. Reference re Consti-
tution Act, 1987, s . 92(10)(a) (1988), 64 O.R . (2d) 393 (C.A.) .
103 See clauses 4-8 in particular. However, if "relief" against the Crown in s . 17(1)
includes Dyson-type declaratory relief, then Bill C-38 reduces the Federal Court's area
of exclusive jurisdiction in federal administrative law by authorizing the institution in a
provincial court of an action directly challenging the validity of a federal regulation or
order in council, for example . See supra, footnote 3 .
104 Supra, footnote 25 .
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The Federal Court Act, 1971 was an extraordinarily poorly designed
piece of legislation, especially since many of its defects were anticipated
by commentators and brought to the attention of the Minister of Justice
of the day, Mr. John Turner. It was less easy to predict, however, that
the Supreme Court of Canada would, until recently, take nearly every
opportunity to reduce the Federal Court's jurisdiction through a narrow
interpretation of both the Constitution and the Federal Court Act itself.
It will take a concerted effort by the judiciary, the Justice Depart-
ment, and Parliament if the Federal Court is to realize its potential to be
a valuable institution within the Canadian court system : in other words,
to be a part of the solution, not part of the problem.
